Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 2

10-1-2011

Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the
Bar for Disclosure of Online Speakers
Mallory Allen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Internet Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mallory Allen, Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the Bar for Disclosure of
Online Speakers, 7 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 75 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized
editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 7, ISSUE 2 FALL 2011

NINTH CIRCUIT UNMASKS ANONYMOUS INTERNET
USERS AND LOWERS THE BAR FOR DISCLOSURE OF
ONLINE SPEAKERS
Mallory Allen *
© Mallory Allen
Cite as: 7 Wash J.L. Tech. & Arts 75 (2011)
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/handle/1773.1/1066

ABSTRACT
There is no judicial consensus about what test to apply
when plaintiffs attempt to obtain the identity of an
anonymous Internet user during discovery in an online
defamation case. In July 2010, the Ninth Circuit became
the first federal appeals court to devise an articulable test
to determine when a plaintiff may compel disclosure of an
online commentator. Previously, federal courts had applied
inconsistent balancing tests to determine whether
disclosure was appropriate. In In re Anonymous Online
Speakers, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Delaware statecourt standard from Doe v. Cahill but applied this test in a
way that made it easier for commercial defamation
plaintiffs to obtain the identity of anonymous defendants.
This Article surveys the prevalent online defamation cases,
summarizing the three primary judicial tests applied by
state courts and positing that other circuits likely will adopt
the reasoning set forth in Anonymous Online Speakers for
commercial online speech.
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INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of Internet chat rooms and message
boards, courts must increasingly balance plaintiffs’ right to seek
redress for defamatory speech with a potential defendant’s First
Amendment right to engage in anonymous free speech. While state
courts have established various standards to determine when a
plaintiff may compel disclosure of an online commentator, before
Anonymous Online Speakers, 1 only two federal circuit courts had
addressed anonymous online commercial speech. 2 The courts in
both of these cases neglected to articulate a standard for
1

In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion
withdrawn and superseded by In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265,
2011 WL 61635 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
2
See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009);
NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998). Few federal courts
have decided an appropriate standard for disclosure of anonymous Internet
speakers because appellate courts rarely consider interlocutory review of
discovery disputes under the collateral order doctrine. See Mohawk Industries,
Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (reiterating that the class of
appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership”).

2011]

NINTH CIRCUIT UNMASKS ANONYMOUS INTERNET USERS

77

determining when disclosure of a poster’s identity was appropriate.
In formulating its test, the district court in Anonymous Online
Speakers relied on the “summary judgment” standard articulated in
Doe v. Cahill: in order to disclose the identity of an online
commentator, plaintiffs must survive a hypothetical motion for
summary judgment by making a prima facie showing for each
element of the claim. 3 While the Cahill court required a
defamation plaintiff to make a substantial legal and factual
showing that the complaint had sufficient merit before the court
would unmask an anonymous Internet speaker, the Ninth Circuit
declined to adopt such a clearly defined standard.
While the Ninth Circuit did not reverse the lower court’s
application of the Cahill summary judgment standard, the Court
suggested that Cahill’s standard, although potentially appropriate
for political speech, does not apply to commercial speech. The
Court instead advocated for an attenuated summary judgment
standard where the nature of the speech in question should be the
primary deciding factor. Noting a distinction between commercial
speech and non-commercial speech, the Court determined that the
identity of an alleged defamer should be revealed with increased
ease in commercial speech cases. 4
I. INTERNET ANONYMITY AS A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
Courts have long protected anonymous speech, recognizing
that “an author’s decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” 5 As
3

Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 459 (Del. 2005).
The original, and presently used, definition of commercial speech is
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 376 (1973);
see also Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (commercial speech is "related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience…").
5
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995)
(invalidating an Ohio election law that prohibited the circulation of anonymous
leaflets in connection with political campaigns). See also Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (invalidating a city ordinance that prohibited the
distribution of any handbill in the city unless the name and address of the author,
4
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electronic communication became more prevalent, the U.S.
Supreme Court responded by holding that online speech retains the
same protections as other forms of speech. 6 In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ability
to speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust
exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves
freely without a fear of retaliation that could lead to the chilling of
online speech. 7
Nevertheless, the right to anonymous speech is a qualified
privilege that extends only so far. Courts have consistently held
“[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem.” 8 For example,
fighting words “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.” 9
The tort of defamation seeks to address intentionally or
negligently injurious statements. To create liability for defamation
there must be a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher with
respect to the act of publication; and either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication. 10 A communication is defamatory
if it “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.” 11
The Supreme Court has been careful to draw distinctions
between politically motivated defamatory speech and
sponsor, or preparer was identified).
6
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997) (noting that “our cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied” to online speech).
7
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
8
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
9
Id. at 572.
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
11
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
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commercially motivated defamatory speech; the latter is not
granted the same level of First Amendment protection. In fact,
before 1976, the Supreme Court assumed that commercial speech
fell outside the realm of First Amendment protection. 12 In 1976 the
Supreme Court held that free‐enterprise depended on the free flow
of information and that truthful, non-misleading advertising was
entitled to First Amendment protection. 13 The Court re-established
its position in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission
of New York by instituting a four-part test that emphasized the
accuracy and lawfulness of the advertising. 14 Commercial speech
has never enjoyed the same degree of protection given to political
expression.
Courts have encountered new challenges when applying First
Amendment principles in the online context. While some courts
have found the immediacy and size of the Internet increases the
harm of defamatory speech, 15 others have found the exact
opposite, commenting that Internet speech is full of hyperbole,
sarcasm and invective language not taken seriously by any
reasonable reader. 16 For example, if readers do not take online
commentary seriously, a plaintiff may not be sufficiently harmed
12

See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
13
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65.
14
Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15
See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL 1210372, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc.
v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001). “In
this age of communication in cyberspace, the potential dangers that could flow
from the dissemination of such information increase exponentially as the
proliferation of shareholder chat rooms continues unabated, and more and more
traders utilize the Internet as a means of buying and selling stocks. As such, the
wrongful dissemination of such information through the Internet may also fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protections.”
16
See Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264
(C.D. Cal. 2001). Internet defamation cases must be viewed in light of the fact
that bulletin boards and chat rooms “are often the repository of a wide range of
casual, emotive, and imprecise speech,” and recipients of any harmful or
offensive statements “do not necessarily attribute the same level of credence to
the statements that they would accord to statements made in other contexts.”
MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 522 (2d ed. 2001).
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to merit recovery for the tort of defamation. On the other hand,
language that may not have been defamatory if spoken or
published on paper can become defamatory if broadcasted to an
audience of millions.
II. THE BALANCING ACT: THE TESTS AND HOW THEY COMPARE
When a plaintiff alleges Internet defamation but does not know
the identity of his or her defamer, he or she must first serve a
subpoena on the website host or the Internet service provider (ISP)
asking for the release of the potential defendant’s identity. 17 Many
ISPs oppose the request in an attempt to protect their customers’
privacy. The court must then hold a hearing to determine the
propriety of disclosure. It is in this context that the courts must
apply a balancing test between the plaintiffs’ rights to be free from
defamatory conduct and the defendants’ rights to anonymous free
speech.
A. Federal Courts
Because no federal court had articulated a standard for when
unmasking an anonymous Internet speaker is appropriate, most
courts looked to state-court tests for guidance. In fact, only two
federal cases have addressed the issue of revealing the identity of
an anonymous Internet user in a defamation case: NLRB v.
Midland Daily News 18 and Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. 19
In Midland Daily News, a government agency moved to
compel a newspaper to answer a subpoena for the identity of an
anonymous advertiser. 20 The district court and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied this request. 21 As the court of appeals
17

Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, online
publishers (ISPs) enjoy immunity from civil liability for defamatory content
posted by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). As such, ISPs are not the
targeted defendants in defamation suits.
18
See NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
19
See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009).
20
Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d at 472-73.
21
Id. at 472.
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explained, permitting the NLRB to obtain the identity of Midland’s
advertiser without requiring it to demonstrate a reasonable basis
for seeking such information would have an unconstitutional
chilling effect on the newspaper’s ability to publish lawful
advertisements. 22 The plaintiff in this case facially failed to
demonstrate a substantial state interest that outweighed the danger
to the free speech rights of Midland, its anonymous advertiser, and
to countless other similarly situated entities across the nation. 23 In
addition, the court found that NLRB could have used lessextensive and less-intrusive means to access the information it
desired. 24
In Lefkoe, the Fourth Circuit permitted the deposition of an
anonymous speaker in a securities-fraud suit. 25 The court utilized
an extremely lenient disclosure standard, reasoning that once the
plaintiff carries his or her burden and shows that the information
held by the Doe Client “could be relevant and useful” to the
defense of the litigation, the governmental interest in providing a
fair trial is served by unveiling the identity of the anonymous
speaker. 26
Neither federal appeals court articulated with any degree of
precision how lower courts should weigh the First Amendment
rights of anonymous speakers against the right of identity
disclosure for defamation plaintiffs.
B. State Courts
State courts have applied three distinct tests to determine when
a plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to merit a court-issued
motion to compel disclosure of the identity of an anonymous
poster. Courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate either (1) a
good faith basis warranting disclosure; (2) evidence sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss before allowing disclosure; or
(3) evidence sufficient to survive a hypothetical motion for
22

Id. at 475.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir. 2009).
26
Id. at 249.
23
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summary judgment. The former asks for the least stringent proof,
while the latter requires the most robust proof from the plaintiff.
1. The Good Faith Standard
The good faith standard, espoused in In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc., requires the plaintiff to show only
that his claim was made in good faith and not out of intent to
harass the defendant. 27 In America Online, the plaintiffs, under the
pseudonym of “Anonymously Publicly Traded Company,” alleged
that several anonymous posters (referred to as “John Does”)
published defamatory material misrepresentations and confidential
material insider information in various Internet chat rooms and
sought to discover the identity of these anonymous posters. 28 In
considering the plaintiff’s request, the court applied a balancing
test focused on “whether a state’s interest in protecting its citizens
against potentially actionable communications on the Internet is
sufficient to outweigh the right to anonymously speak [through the
Internet].”29 Under this standard, a plaintiff must only demonstrate
that a cause of action may exist in order for the court to abridge the
right to communicate anonymously on the Internet. 30
In articulating the precise scope of this “good faith” standard,
the court determined that the party requesting the subpoena must
have a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the
victim of actionable conduct and that the subpoenaed identity
information is “centrally needed to advance that claim.” 31 The
court determined this good faith basis was met, denied America
Online’s motion to quash the subpoena, and ordered disclosure of
the identities of the John Does. 32
Other courts have rejected the good faith standard as setting
the bar too low to protect a defendant's First Amendment right to
27

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL
1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
28
Id. at *1.
29
Id. at *5.
30
Am. Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *7.
31
Id. at *8.
32
Id.
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speak anonymously on the Internet. 33
2. The Prima Facie Case Standard
In Dendrite International v. Doe No. 3, the plaintiff, a
corporation, sought a discovery request to ascertain the identity of
a certain John Doe No. 3 from an ISP, Yahoo!, because of alleged
defamation and other actionable statements made on a Yahoo!
bulletin board.34 The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate
Division applied a prima facie case standard, which requires
plaintiffs to satisfy a four-prong test akin to resisting a motion to
dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff must support his or her
claim with a prima facie evidentiary showing such that the action
can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 35
In order to satisfy the test, the court determined that plaintiffs
must first “undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that
they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of
disclosure.” 36 This step should include posting a message of
notification of the identity request on the ISP’s message board and
the withholding of any further legal action to allow the John Doe
defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve an
opposition. 37
The second step requires the plaintiff to identify the precise
alleged actionable speech made by each anonymous poster. 38 The
plaintiff met this burden by (1) identifying specific statements as
purportedly defamatory; (2) identifying John Doe No. 3 as the
speaker; and (3) establishing that the statements were in fact
published on Yahoo!'s bulletin board.39
Third, before a court will order identity disclosure, the plaintiff
must set forth a prima facie cause of action that can withstand a
33

See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462 (Del. 2005).
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760, n. 1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
35
Id. at 760.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 770.
34
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motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 40
Fourth, if the plaintiff has presented a sufficient cause of
action, the court should then balance the defendant’s First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of
the case presented and the necessity of the identity disclosure to
the plaintiff’s ability to properly proceed. 41 Under the Dendrite
test, this final balancing test does not occur until a prima facie
claim of defamation has been established. 42 The court largely
based its opinion on a concern for discovery abuse by disgruntled
plaintiffs looking to harass, intimidate or retaliate.43
Based on this test, the court determined that the motion judge
appropriately concluded that Dendrite failed to establish a
sufficient nexus between John Doe No. 3’s statements and
Dendrite's allegations of harm; therefore, disclosure of John Doe
No. 3’s identity was not warranted.44
Compared to the good faith standard, Dendrite’s prima facie
case standard demands much more of a plaintiff seeking disclosure
of the identity of an anonymous speaker. Even after the plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss,
the court may still balance the right of disclosure against the
anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights. Such a requirement
asks for much more than a mere “good faith” claim.
3. The Summary Judgment Standard in Doe v. Cahill
The Supreme Court of Delaware became the first state supreme
court to hear a request for disclosure of an online defamation
defendant in Doe v. Cahill. 45 The court held that, in order to
disclose the identity of an online commentator, plaintiffs must
40

Id. at 760.
Id.
42
Id. at 770.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 771.
45
Monique C.M. Leahy, Cause of Action for Internet Defamation:
Discovery of Anonymous Posters and Protective Orders, 32 CAUSES OF ACTION
2d 281 § 36, (originally published 2006; updated September 2010).
41
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survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment by making a
prima facie showing for each element of the claim. 46
In Doe v. Cahill, a city councilman sued John Doe defendants
for defamation after they allegedly posted defamatory comments
on a local political website alleging that Mr. Cahill’s mental
condition was deteriorating and his leadership failing. 47 The
plaintiff subpoenaed the ISP for the IP addresses and identities of
the bloggers. 48 The court recognized that granting the subpoena
might chill political speech in violation of the First Amendment,
ultimately holding that the summary judgment standard “more
appropriately balances a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his
reputation and a defendant’s right to speak anonymously.” 49 In
reaching its conclusion, the court determined that no reasonable
person could have interpreted Doe’s statements as defamatory as
they were no more than an “unfounded and unconvincing
opinion.” 50 Such statements cannot give rise to a prima facie case
for defamation liability. 51
The court found Dendrite’s four-part test unnecessary,
adopting only parts one and three. In particular, the court
eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff set forth the exact
statements made by the anonymous poster because that portion is
“subsumed in the summary judgment inquiry.” 52 The court further
found that part four “adds no protection above and beyond that of
the summary judgment test,” needlessly complicating the
analysis. 53 In sum, in order to satisfy the summary judgment
standard, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each
element and give notice to the speaker. 54

46

Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
Id. at 454.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 462.
50
Id. at 467.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 461.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 463-64 (“A public figure defamation plaintiff must only plead and
prove facts with regard to elements of the claim that are within his control.”).
47
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III. INTERPRETATION OF CAHILL IN ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS
In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, the commercial
defamation in question was an allegation that defendant, Signature
Management TEAM, LLC (TEAM), had created an online smear
campaign against the corporate plaintiff, Quixtar, Inc. 55 Quixtar
alleged that the defamation was effected through anonymous
postings disparaging Quixtar and its business practices. 56 During
discovery, Quixtar requested TEAM release the identities of five
anonymous online posters, alleged employees of the company. 57
TEAM refused, so Quixtar filed a motion to compel disclosure in
the District Court of Nevada. 58 Based on the test announced in Doe
v. Cahill, the district court ordered TEAM to release the identities
of three of the five pseudonyms. 59
Both Quixtar and TEAM petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ
of mandamus challenging the order to release the identities. 60
While the Ninth Circuit denied both writs for mandamus, it did so
based on the fact that neither party had demonstrated a need for the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus. 61 As the district court’s
55

In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2010)
opinion withdrawn and superseded by In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No.
09-71265, 2011 WL 61635, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011).
56
Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *1 (the claims were based on
comments such as “Quixtar has regularly, but secretly, acknowledged that its
products are overpriced and not sellable”; “Quixtar refused to pay bonuses to
IBOs in good standing”; Quixtar “terminated IBOs without due process”;
“Quixtar currently suffers from systemic dishonesty”; and “Quixtar is aware of,
approves, promotes, and facilitates the systematic noncompliance with the FTC's
Amway rules.”)
57
Id.
58
Id. at *5.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
In federal courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 provides that appellate review of
lower-court decisions should be postponed until after a final judgment has been
rendered in the lower court. A writ of mandamus offers an exception to this rule
and allows a dissatisfied party to appeal a decision before the trial proceeds.
However, such an order is issued only in exceptional circumstances. See Kerr v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). See also Kathryn Freund, Ninth
Circuit Argues for Less Stringent Test for Protecting Anonymous Online
Commercial Speech, JOLT DIGEST, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (July 27, 2010, 9:19

2011]

NINTH CIRCUIT UNMASKS ANONYMOUS INTERNET USERS

87

decision was not “clearly erroneous as a matter of law,” the Ninth
Circuit upheld the lower court’s order.62
Nevertheless, the court determined that where commercial
speech is at issue, the Cahill test requires too much of a showing
by the plaintiff. While the Ninth Circuit refrained from overturning
the district court’s usage of the summary judgment standard from
Cahill, the court nevertheless held the standard to be too strict for
commercial defamation actions.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that it had not previously
considered First Amendment claims of an anonymous non-party
speaker on the Internet in a circumstance involving commercial
speech and noted that previous commercial speech cases failed to
establish a relevant standard. 63 After raising and dismissing various
tests, including the Dendrite “prima facie” standard and the
America Online “good faith” standard, the court found the Cahill
standard to be “the most exacting,” 64 but considered it too strict of
a standard for commercial speech. The court noted that because
Cahill addresses political speech, the heightened summary
judgment standard was appropriate, but the court found that when
commercial speech is balanced against a discretionary discovery
order under Federal Rule of Procedure 26, “Cahill’s bar extends
too far.” 65 The court reasoned that because of the lesser
constitutional protection afforded commercial speech, a lower bar
to reveal the identities of the anonymous posters was more
appropriate.66
In limiting Cahill’s application to political speech, the court
judged the degree of protection given to online speakers by “the
impact the speech has on the other party rather than the intent of
the speaker.” 67 The court explicitly clarified that if the lower court
had refused to unmask the anonymous speakers, “its application of
PM),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/9th-circuit/in-re-anonymous-onlinespeakers.
62
Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *7.
63
Id. at *4.
64
Id. at *5.
65
Id. at *6.
66
Id.
67
See Freund, supra note 60.
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the wrong test could have rendered that decision reversible.” 68
Anonymous Online’s “new” standard considers the nature of
the speech as the primary driving force in balancing the rights of
anonymous speakers in discovery disputes, based upon the idea
that “the specific circumstances surrounding the speech serve to
give context to the balancing exercise.” 69 Commercial speech, as
opposed to political speech, enjoys a “limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values.” 70 This “subordinate position” makes
commercial speech “subject to modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” 71
Contrasted with Cahill, the Ninth Circuit found that the
anonymous speech in Anonymous Online did not involve expressly
political speech, but rather, “speech related to the non-competition
and non-solicitation provisions of Quixtar’s commercial
contracts.”72
Although the Ninth Circuit denied the writs of mandamus at
issue for procedural reasons, the Anonymous Online decision
provides the backdrop for a useful discussion of the protection
afforded to Internet free speech in the commercial context. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous Online may indicate
that courts are lowering the bar for plaintiffs who attempt to
unmask anonymous bloggers.

68

See Julian A. Biggs, Not So Brave New World: Unmasking Anonymous
Online Defamation, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 7, 2010.
69
Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *6.
70
Id. at *2, (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
71
Bd. of Trs. of State. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)
(quotations omitted) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
72
Anonymous Online, 2011 WL 61635, at *6. Although the court found that
the speech in question was not “expressly political,” the court refused to decide
if the speech at issue constitutes commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s
definition in Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Nevertheless, “even if the speech was commercial, the district court’s
choice of the Cahill test did not constitute clear error.”
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IV. WHY OTHER CIRCUITS WILL FOLLOW ANONYMOUS ONLINE’S
INTERPRETATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Anonymous Online will remain influential in online defamation
cases for two distinct reasons. First, writs of mandamus are
universally considered an extraordinary form of relief and
appellate courts commonly avoid discovery disputes.73 Therefore,
very few appellate courts hear cases where plaintiffs in defamation
cases seek to identify anonymous Internet commentators. Until the
U.S. Supreme Court squarely addresses the proper disclosure test
for commercial speech, it is likely that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in Anonymous Online will remain the primary authority on the
subject.
Second, Anonymous Online will continue to influence courts’
decision-making because many likely “subpoena targets,” such as
Google, Yahoo!, and Bing are physically located in the Ninth
Circuit, and are therefore bound by the precedent set in Anonymous
Online. 74 Courts that have not selected a balancing test will most
likely look to the Ninth Circuit as the circuit court that consistently
deals with the most established and technologically prominent
parties.
The court in Anonymous Online held that courts should
examine the nature of the speech at issue to determine whether the
speech is commercial—and therefore subject to unmasking—or
political, and thus protected by the First Amendment. This
emphasis on the nature of the speech may create potential litigation
problems for parties seeking to unmask anonymous commentators.
For example, it is entirely possible that a party making defamatory
statements could include both political and commercial statements
in order to maintain anonymity while still causing significant harm.
In addition, basing the test on the nature of the anonymous
speech at issue is problematic in cases where the true nature of the
speech cannot be determined until after the author’s identity is
revealed. 75 For example, a cause of action for defamation relating
73

See id. at *3.
Biggs, supra note 67.
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See id.
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to the use of insider information might be predicated upon whether
or not the author of alleged defamatory content is an employee of a
plaintiff company, as opposed to whether the author is completely
unaffiliated with the company.
CONCLUSION
Anonymous Online provides a useful standard for lower courts
to follow when deciding whether to reveal the identity of an
anonymous Internet user in a defamation lawsuit. First, the
standard requires that the court determine the nature of the
anonymous speech and decide whether that speech is commercial
or political in nature. Second, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes that
when speech is commercial, Internet anonymity warrants less First
Amendment protection and therefore a less-demanding test for the
plaintiff to attain revelation of an anonymous commentator. After
Anonymous Online, the classification of certain speech as
commercial or non-commercial will likely have substantial
consequences for plaintiffs in Internet defamation cases.
Nevertheless, Anonymous Online leaves some questions
unanswered. While the court discussed the appropriate standard for
commercial speech, it did not explicitly determine the threshold
that must be met in order to uncover a politically motivated
anonymous speaker. As such, the good faith standard, the prima
facie case standard, or Cahill’s summary judgment standard may
still be used in cases of alleged politically motivated defamation.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Defamation plaintiffs seeking the identity of an anonymous
online commentator under Anonymous Online should
demonstrate that the speech at issue is commercial in nature
by looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Central Hudson
decision.



Commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Central Hudson means speech that is "related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and
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goes to the heart of the plaintiff's commercial practices or
its business operations. 76


If commercially motivated, the lawsuit should be framed as
a commercial case. 77 Instead of filing a defamation
complaint, it may be wiser to explicitly classify the cause
of action as an economic tort, such as unfair competition or
other unfair trade practices.



If the speech at issue is unquestionably politically
motivated, the plaintiff’s most viable argument is to show
that the speech meets a higher threshold test. Anonymous
Online discussed the appropriate standard for commercial
speech, indicating that the threshold is lower than the
threshold for political speech, but the court did not
explicitly determine the precise threshold that must be met
in order to uncover the anonymous speaker in a politically
motivated context. Here, courts may continue to look to the
good faith standard, the prima facie case standard, or
Cahill’s summary judgment standard to answer such
requests.

76

Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
77
See Biggs, supra note 67.
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